Neighborhood schools, transport and the fight for equality (2023)

Criticism of school bus service is nothing new. There is also no support for neighborhood schools. So it was no surprise when the Milwaukee School Board ordered neighborhood schools back last fall, and Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson ordered a 10% reduction in Milwaukee bus trips in his state. in January from the address of the ordered state.

It would be surprising if such policy changes were implemented equitably without negatively impacting African-American students, who make up 61% of Milwaukee public school students. Given Milwaukee's widespread residential segregation and the city's historic approach to neighborhood school and bus service, which has unfairly affected the black community, there is much cause for concern.
As the school board debates how to implement its new policies, it faces three main challenges:

• How do you ensure that the return to neighborhood schools does not deprive African-American students of school facilities or academic programs equivalent to those available in city magnet schools and schools with a high percentage of white students?
• How to balance your goal of neighborhood schools and reduced bus rides with council policies, especially parental choice, which is based on bus rides. (Only 20% of all MPS families choose the neighborhood school as their first choice.)
• How to find the political courage to demand that the governor, mayor, and other opponents of bus rides support a school construction program to ensure there are enough schools in the neighborhoods where children live. An estimated 18,000 students, mostly African American, cannot attend a school in their neighborhood because there are not enough schools where they live.

Hanging over these discussions is the often unasked question of how much our community values ​​children's learning in a racially integrated environment. Many educators believe that integrated classrooms better prepare students for life in a multiracial society. Is the return to neighborhood schools based on sound pedagogical principles, or is it a capitulation to longstanding opposition by many in the white community to integrated schools where whites can be a minority?

educational apartheid

Given the way Milwaukee has handled desegregation, bus fares have skyrocketed over the years. The total for 1997 exceeded $53 million, 7.6% of the MPS budget. Almost all the money comes from the state.

Neither MPS students nor many of their parents and teachers were alive when the bus controversy first hit the city some 40 years ago. The controversy, rooted in Milwaukee's segregated living patterns, began when the school district used buses to reduce school overcrowding but restricted black students to certain schools.

The overcrowding began in the 1950s and 1960s, when the neighborhood faced demographic pressures both in the center and on the periphery of the city. A large migration of African-American families to the city center, virtually the only place they could live in the Milwaukee area, caused white families to flee to the city's periphery and suburbs. In addition, road construction and urban renewal have destroyed thousands of homes in the center of the city. According to William F. Thompson in his History of Wisconsin, vol. HE SAW.

To reduce overcrowding during school construction and renovation, the district relocated entire “untouched” classes to other schools. From 1958 to 1972, more than 36,000 students were transported under this policy. In nine cases, white students were bused to black schools. But in more than 280 cases, black children were bussed to white schools and remained "intact"; H. in racially segregated classrooms in white schools.
Black students remained officially enrolled in their neighborhood school. In some cases, they and their teachers were taken back to their home school for lunch and recess and then taken back to the white school for afternoon classes. The time spent on the bus each week was often the equivalent of a school day. Although district policies limited these "intact" bus trips to one semester or less, students at some schools were transported intact for up to five years.

The school board used other techniques, which turned out to be unconstitutional violations of the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, to maintain racial segregation. These included student transfer policies that allowed whites to drop out of integrated schools, build new schools in white neighborhoods but not black neighborhoods, and change school boundaries.

For example, when many blacks moved into a previously white neighborhood, the school district changed the neighborhood's school boundaries so that the new black neighborhood remained with the adjacent predominantly black school.
The school board's racist views were perhaps best summed up by member Lorraine Radtke, who complained that inner-city kids "can't understand our facility. You have to pee in a soda machine."

These apartheid-like policies ensured the "containment" of African-American students in inner-city schools. They were also consistent with spatial segregation and discrimination in the workplace. Until the 1950s, racially restrictive agreements by government agencies, real estate agents, and financial institutions in many Milwaukee neighborhoods and suburbs prohibited the sale of homes to nonwhites. In 1948, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Shelley v. Kraemer that federal and state courts could no longer sanction such agreements, but it was not until three years later that the Wisconsin legislature struck down the state statute that allowed such agreements.

Between 1962 and 1967, the Milwaukee Common Council consistently defeated open housing legislation by a vote of 18 to 1. The only dissenter was Vel Phillips, the only black member of the council. The Joint Council passed a Fair Housing Ordinance in 1968, but only after thousands of people demonstrated for 200 straight days, led by the late James Groppi and the NAACP Youth Council.

Since the 1960s, the practices of financial institutions, the discrimination of real estate agents, and the zoning laws of local governments have perpetuated residential segregation. The term "hypersegregation" is often applied to the Milwaukee metropolitan area.

For example, a USA Today study based on the 1990 census ranked Milwaukee as the seventh largest of more than 200 metropolitan areas. Additionally, a 1995 US News and World Report study ranked Milwaukee among the 20 worst cities in the nation for disparities between banking facilities in white and primarily minority areas. In terms of jobs, Milwaukee had the largest gap between black and white unemployment rates of any metropolitan area in 1990.

school breakdown

In the early 1960s, and coinciding with the national civil rights movement, members of the black community began demanding that school boards end school segregation. The school board refused. His advocacy, according to Thompson's History of Wisconsin, was the "preservation of the neighborhood school." The NAACP then unsuccessfully petitioned the state Superintendent of Public Instruction to end state funding for Milwaukee schools unless they were not segregated. In March 1964, the NAACP, CORE, and others formed MUSIC, the Milwaukee United Schools Integration Committee. Their aim was to carry out "mass actions", including boycotts, to impose the problem.

Half of the students in Central City schools participated in the first boycott on May 18, 1964, the tenth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, and attended the Freedom Schools founded by MUSIC. For two years, protests, pickets, prayer vigils, marches and other boycotts raised public awareness about segregation and intact bus service, but failed to move the school board. Finally, in December 1965, attorney Lloyd Barbee filed a formal annulment in federal court on behalf of 41 black and white children.

Eleven years later, in 1976, Federal Judge John Reynolds concluded that the school board's policy of "restraint" and segregation "deliberately caused and maintained a dual school system." At the time of the Reynolds ruling, 34% of Milwaukee public school students were black, 60% white, and 6% Hispanic and "other." 73 MPS schools were more than 90% white, while 31 schools were more than 90% black. The school board spent more than a million dollars appealing the suspension decision, making it one of the costliest school suspension cases in United States history.

one way bus

Anti-segregation protests in Milwaukee never reached the levels of violence seen in Boston, where buses carrying black students were met with a shower of stones and racial slurs. But the underlying problems were the same. Some fringe groups in Milwaukee unsuccessfully tried to organize against "mandatory buses," which was a code word to keep blacks out of white-only schools and neighborhoods. But the whites resisted mainly by leaving the MPS for private schools or suburban public schools. Although there were no mandatory buses for white students, between 1975, the year before the court order, and 1977, some 14,500 white students, "one-fifth of the total," dropped out of MPS. In 1980, white student enrollment dropped by another 14,700 from MPS's enrollment. At the same time, no poll would be complete without acknowledging that significant numbers of whites have been involved in anti-segregation protests and efforts to make integration work. As in other cities, the Milwaukee movement exemplified a multiracial commitment to equal opportunity for all children.

In late 1975 and early 1976, the school administration organized parents and officials from each school to help develop a desegregation plan. This process culminated in the election of a multi-racial “Committee of 100” comprised of parent, community, and staff representatives. Among other things, the committee proposed that certain Northside schools be "paired and grouped" with certain Southside schools to ensure equitable bus rides for black and white students. Then-Superintendent Lee McMurrin, Assistant Superintendent David Bennett, and the school board disagreed. Instead, the school board approved a "voluntary" integration plan, under which families could send their children to any school as long as it promoted integration.

However, what was voluntary for the white community became involuntary for the black community. The older schools in the city center were initially overcrowded. Additionally, due to previous construction that favored schools in white neighborhoods, several downtown schools were so dilapidated that they were closed. Others were renovated and opened as specialized schools throughout the city to encourage white families to volunteer to bus their children downtown. One study found that school closures displaced more than 4,600 blacks in the first four years of desegregation.

The consequent lack of "places" in schools in black neighborhoods forced many blacks to "choose" to go elsewhere.

Larry Harwell, who ran the Organization of Organizations at the time, thought the policy of closing inner-city schools and opening specialized schools in their place was conscious. “It was part of a deliberate policy to drive blacks out of an area of ​​the city just north of downtown in preparation for redeveloping downtown for whites,” he recently told Rethinking Schools. "Virtually all of the black schools in this area have been closed or converted to citywide magnet schools and closed to neighborhood residents."
People also criticized the "shotgun" approach to bus travel, which resulted in children from some inner-city neighborhoods visiting areas that attended as many as 100 different schools. The practice continues today (see table, p. 22).

Initially, many African Americans did not find driving a bus challenging. One of the main goals of the civil rights movement was to ensure access to all schools, and in Milwaukee, that finally seemed to be becoming a reality. In addition, many black parents viewed their neighborhood schools as inferior to newer, better-equipped, and more spacious schools in white suburban neighborhoods.

In June 1977, at the end of the first year of desegregation, things were not going so well. A growing number in the African American community were concerned that for every seven black students arrested for integration, only one white student was riding the bus. In addition, the district has done virtually nothing to prepare the staff or students at formerly white schools for desegregation. The reception experienced by black students and staff was at times discriminatory and racist. On a legal level, the federal appeals court vacated the original desegregation order and sent it back to the Reynolds court.

In the fall of 1977, the Harwell Organization of Organizations ran a "Two Ways or Neither Way" campaign and organized a school boycott. Other organizations, including the Coalition for Peaceful Schools and People United for Integration and Quality Education, also called for a more equitable desegregation plan.

These demands fell on deaf ears. Superintendent McMurrin and the school board vehemently refused to merge black and white schools. Conservative panel members were encouraged by the Court of Appeals decision and hoped that the entire desegregation process could be stopped. The liberal panelists were concerned about subsequent appeals and did not want to jeopardize the progress made.

No lawmaker had the political will to force white children to attend schools in predominantly black neighborhoods. However, many African Americans continued to volunteer to attend previously all-white schools. Others, unable to find a place in their neighborhood schools, were essentially forced to "volunteer themselves." And during that time, Latino educators and parents organized and pursued legal strategies to ensure that the educational rights and needs of Hispanic students were guaranteed in the annulment process, which only defined students as Black or non-Black.

As litigation continued and concerns were raised that the increasingly conservative United States Supreme Court might overturn Reynolds' decision, lawyers for the plaintiffs eventually sought an out-of-court settlement. The school board voted 9 to 6 to participate. All three Black Board members opposed the deal because some schools remained 100% black; the three arch-conservative members opposed it because they refused to admit a conscious division.
Despite the objections of large sections of the black community, including the NAACP, in May 1979 Judge Reynolds approved a five-year settlement out of court. According to one of the original attorneys for the plaintiffs, Irvin Charne, although the specific court-ordered remedies lasted only five years, the agreement included a permanent injunction against intentional expulsion by the school board.

Since 1984, the district has operated under the voluntary cancellation guidelines of the agreement. The part of the agreement dealing with the unbundling of MPS power was included in the union contract and is still subject to collective bargaining. The current contract establishes that the percentage of black teachers in each school must be 5% to 10% more or less than the municipal percentage of black MPS teachers (around 18%), except in the two Afro-Immersion-American schools, where the percentage of black teachers can reach 35%.

opposite tendencies

Support for buses has declined for reasons other than problems with one-way buses and white resistance to integration. There has always been debate within the black community as to whether integration will result in quality education for African Americans. Furthermore, even in many unaggregated schools, there is a persistent gap in academic achievement between black and white students. MPS demographics also changed significantly, making disaggregation increasingly difficult (the percentage of white students dropped from 60% in 1975 to 20% in 1997). Finally, many black parents often feel excluded from full participation in their children's schools, and this exclusion is exacerbated by the long distances between homes and schools.

An early indication of declining African-American support for integration was the success of the Coalition to Save the Northern Divide in 1980. Led by then-community activist Howard Fuller, the Coalition mobilized to demand that the newly created Northern Divide be saved and it will continue to be a neighborhood high school rather than a special all-city school, even if it means the school must remain all-black.
Additionally, proponents of African American immersion schools have garnered widespread support from the black community. This is further evidence of the widespread belief among African-Americans that their children are not necessarily well served in integrated schools and that a quality education can be provided in an all-black environment.

At the same time, it would be one-sided not to acknowledge that as more integration opportunities emerged, thousands of integration opportunities were seized. As a result of a 1984 lawsuit brought by MPS and the NAACP against 24 Milwaukee suburbs, the Chapter 220 desegregation program was greatly expanded, and thousands of black students transferred to suburban schools. When the program was threatened with extinction in 1994, important sectors of the black community came to its defense. This school year, 5,100 black MPS students are enrolled in suburban Chapter 220 schools; there was no room for another 3,800 who also wanted to attend.

Less bus traffic or more options?

Two other political priorities—parental choice and low property taxes—contributed to Milwaukee's extensive bus service. Both are favored by top lawmakers, including Governor Thompson and Mayor John Norquist.

Giving parents their first choice in schools obviously means that they will have to take the bus if their choice is not the neighborhood school. According to MPS officials, only one-fifth of MPS students name a neighborhood school as their first choice during the annual school selection process.
Approximately 63% of all MPS students ride the bus to school, either yellow school buses or Milwaukee County buses. By district, 69% (some 44,000 students) travel to choose a school. Of the remainder, 24% are operated by buses to reduce congestion and 7% are exceptional education students in need of special services.
The government has tried to reduce bus traffic over the years. In 1991, for example, the city's primary schools were divided into five regions. It limited parents to choosing from the 20 or so schools in the area, including the neighborhood school, or the 26 specialized schools throughout the city.

A recent proposal would further restrict school choices to the neighborhood school (when not overcrowded) or a citywide magnet school. Families who live in neighborhoods with overcrowded schools—virtually all in the predominantly black North and Northwest areas or the predominantly Latino neighborhood on the South Side—have plenty of four other schools to choose from. The changes will be implemented gradually so that no student is forced to leave their current school.
Such changes will obviously reduce bus use. What's not so obvious is that Black and Hispanic students living in overcrowded neighborhoods still won't have the fundamental option that virtually all white students will have: attending their neighborhood school. There are not enough schools.

As Jeanette Mitchell, former school board president and now director of programs for the Bader Foundation, put it: "I support neighborhood schools, but I don't see how we can do that if we don't build more schools where the kids live." ."

Conclusion: more buildings

The desire to keep property taxes low made it nearly impossible to build enough schools to meet the educational needs of MPS students.

In 1993, for example, the school board and administration presented voters with a $366 million referendum that would have built 12 middle schools and two high schools downtown and renovated dozens more, in part to reduce bus travel for Africans. . american families. Citing property tax concerns, Mayor Norquist, 10 of the 12 white members of the Milwaukee Common Council, and some school board members (but backed by County Executive Tom Ament) defeated the referendum. The referendum came down to whether white property owners would be willing to pay for better public education for African-American and Hispanic children. The answer was a clear "no." In an unprecedented off-year primary turnout, the referendum was defeated 3 to 1. Some white counties voted no with as many as 93%, while predominantly black counties voted yes.

Over the past five years, Mayor Norquist has committed approximately $54 million in city-issued bonds to rebuild and maintain schools. That paid for a backlog of major repairs, like replacing windows and water heaters and renovating six elementary, middle and high schools. In addition, the school district has an annual budget of approximately $7 million for long-term maintenance.
The city and district allocations are completely inadequate. The current 40-year long-term maintenance plan calls for annual expenditures of $13 million to $18 million just to keep MPS's 200+ buildings (18 million square feet) operational, not to mention the construction of additional schools.

A 1992 study of MPS facilities estimated that $1.2 billion in capital improvements were needed to ensure that all children had access to early childhood education, smaller classes, art, music and computer labs, and fully equipped buildings. accessible.

One problem is that, under state law, school building permits require voter approval, while similar city and county permits do not. For example, the $117 million County Jail, the $2 billion sewer tunnel project, and the $150 million Midwest Express Convention Center were built with public funds but without voter approval.

Even if voters reject the housing referendum, lawmakers can find alternatives if they choose. Wisconsin voters rejected, 2-1, a special sports lottery to fund a new county stadium. Shot but not shot, Governor Thompson and the legislature created a new tax agency to raise $250 million in public funds to subsidize the new stadium.
In his State of the State address in January of this year, Governor Thompson said that 10% (about $5 million) of MPS bus funding should go toward building elementary schools in the neighborhood. As Milwaukee Superintendent Alan Brown has pointed out, implementing this policy is difficult. Construction of a new school takes at least two years. The transport of children - and the resources necessary to do so - would have to continue during this period.

Unlike other policies

Bus transportation is also necessary to support sound educational policies. In recent years, school boards have tried to reduce the number of students entering and leaving school as their families move during the school year. According to Mike Turza, director of Student and Parent Services, each school year the district receives approximately 70,000 requests to change promotions because students have moved. Because this "mobility" hurts academic performance, MPS attempts to bus the entire school year to the school where the student entered in September. However, even with this policy, MPS is unable to meet the transportation needs of the approximately 13,000 students (13.7% of the MPS population) who commute during the school year. You could only do this if you increased the bust even more.

Safety and child care issues also affect bus decisions. Many parents prefer to have their children picked up and dropped off at an intersection close to home rather than walk unsupervised to the neighborhood school. (MPS has a policy that children should walk if they are within two miles of their neighborhood school or one mile from a specialized school across town.) according to a recent analysis by Busing MPS. "Transportation offers an answer to unsafe neighborhoods."
In response to these concerns, the government plans to expand preschool and after-school programs to make neighborhood schools more attractive to nearby families.

State Rep. Polly Williams (D-Milw.) has proposed moving specialized schools across the city from crowded African-American neighborhoods to less crowded areas in white neighborhoods to allow for more schools in downtown neighborhoods. The school administration floated the idea in December, but was strongly opposed by officials and parents at all the schools involved.

The administration recommends that all schools in the city have a neighborhood tax of 25%. Another management proposal is to redraw the boundaries of primary education to reflect demographic changes since the last major adjustment 20 years ago. School officials predict that this new lottery for elementary students will reduce the number of students in crowded areas from around 10,000 to 6,000. The full implications will only become apparent when the details of the proposed limits are published.

Wich is the way to go?

The main question remains: How will the new policies to reduce bus trips and return to neighborhood schools affect African American and Hispanic students?

No doubt politicians will continue to attack bus services. However, bus trips are here to stay. With ongoing injunctions against intentional school segregation, legitimate educational reasons for bus riding, ongoing domestic segregation in Milwaukee, and a lack of schools in black neighborhoods, there is no alternative. As he recently told Charne Rethinking Schools, “Milwaukee needs to recognize that given the distribution of the city's population, we cannot eliminate bus travel. The question is: how do we organize the bus service?”

The school board faces two specific challenges. First, how will you shape a neighborhood school and bus policy that addresses the complexity of the issues and also provides quality education for all students?

Second, how will you avoid repeating the mistakes of the past? When MPS returns to neighborhood schools, it must also avoid resorting to injustices that were part of previous neighborhood school policies. It was these injustices that spawned the repeal movement that led to the current bus policy that is now so out of whack.
No one has a simple answer. But knowing what to avoid is an essential start.